Chapter 7: In-Groups and Out-Groups

The Importance of Groups

The Social Dimension

Up to this point I have emphasized purely cognitive approaches to stereotypes and stereotyping. I need make no apology for this emphasis – stereotypes are, after all, whatever else they may be, products of our cognitive activity. But it is time to recognize an insistent reality – stereotypes are also social products. There are three important points to make in that regard.

Stereotypes Are Products of Cultures

Obviously stereotypes are products of cultures, but this vague statement leaves open issues of what the relationship of culture and stereotypes is. Social scientists have generally assumed the culture serves up the content of our stereotypes, and that individuals digest cultural lessons whole. But cultures also dictate, to some extent, what social categories and groups, are recipients of these stereotypes. It is surely no accident that Americans are more likely to stereotype African-Americans than German-Americans, that the French have stronger stereotypes of Algerians than of the Dutch. We stereotype red-heads and blonds but not those with brown hair. Americans have stronger age-related stereotypes than most countries, but tend to mute those based on religion whereas in other countries it is the reverse. The impact of cultural, social and historical forces on stereotyping will be discussed in Chapter 9.

Stereotypes and Affect

Some of our stereotypes are fiercely held and accompanied by strong feelings whereas others seem devoid of emotion. I happen to think basset hounds are ugly and stupid, but I would not be prepared to enter into long and passionate debate with a basset hound owner about my stereotype. Each to his own I say. However, my stereotypes about Texas and Houston have a warmer temperature, and stereotypes about my university and profession seem downright hot.

It is unlikely that this affect is produced purely through cognitive mechanisms, and we need to account for the affect and emotion that accompanies some stereotypes but not others. More importantly since this affect is a sibling if not quite a twin of prejudice, we need to consider the whens and whys of how our stereotypes create and support prejudice. We will consider this in some detail in Chapter 8.

Stereotypes and Out-Groups

Third, stereotypes often seem to be integrally related to our group memberships and with conflict between groups. We seem to have stronger and more negative stereotypes about groups to which we do not belong than to those to which we do. That is the topic of the present chapter.

Ethnocentrism

Ethnocentrism refers to a tendency to favor one’s own group and to derogate other groups. Such derogation has been a constant feature of recorded history. The Old Testament is filled with references to the Hebrews as chosen people, and other groups usually do get good reviews. The ancient Greeks used the word barbarian to refer to those who did not speak the Greek language, and even within Greece itself there were fierce rivalries between city states. The present ethnic and religious wars in the former Yugoslavia and conflict in the Middle East have histories that go back centuries, and Asian and African societies have their own violent legacies. It is probably no exaggeration to suggest that derogation of out-groups is one of the most fundamental and universal features of all societies and cultures.

In extreme cases hostility toward out-groups can result in fighting and death, but there are more subtle and pervasive effects. For example, even the connotations of words reflect this in-group favoritism. A series of experiments by Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, and Tyler (1990) showed that nonsense syllables associated with words such as we, our, and us were rated as more positive than syllables associated with the words, they, them, and their. Presentation of in-group words also increased
the speed of judging how positive traits were and out-group words facilitated ratings of negative words. This facilitation suggests again that in-group words have a strong positive valence and that out-groups words are negative.

Is Out-Group Derogation Natural?

**Sumner:** William Graham Sumner (1906), a pioneer American sociologist as well as a popular and influential teacher at Yale University says yes. He was also a cheerleader for Social Darwinism in the form enunciated by Herbert Spencer. Spencer (1892-3) had argued that human behavior was governed by a "code of amity" (positive feelings and behaviors toward those in our own groups) and a "code of enmity" (negative reactions to others not in our groups). Sumner in his turn invented the terminology of "in-group" (which he also called the "we-group") and "out-group" ("other-group"); he thought that hostility toward the out-group fostered loyalty to the in-group as well as adherence to the folkways (norms) of that group. In other words, conflict with other groups not only naturally heightened negative feelings toward the out-group, but strengthened in-group loyalties and feelings as well. Sumner also coined the term "ethnocentrism" to describe the tendency to measure the appropriateness of behavior in terms of one's own cultural standards and to derogate the behavior and artifacts of other groups precisely because they are not those of the in-group.

While Sumner's strong suit was never well developed, logically derived theory, the whole tenor of his argument suggests that such tendencies are largely innate or otherwise dictated by laws of nature. Sumner felt that attachment to groups was necessary for human survival and that division into competing groups was a natural part of social life. He was of a generation, influenced by the then new theory of evolution, which saw such tendencies as closely linked to basic biological processes, then construed as instincts. Furthermore, it came easily to such people to argue in functionalist terms; in this case adherence to one's own group is generally functional for group and individual survival.

**Sociobiology and Evolution:** Biologically based arguments about social behavior faded from center stage by the 1930s because they became bloated and vacuous. They also lent themselves easily to various forms of racism, and consequently they are still held in low esteem by contemporary social scientists. And yet, when something is as seeming ubiquitous as in-group favoritism, one might at least entertain the idea of some sort of biological basis.

In recent years sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists (see Buss, 1999) have accepted that challenge. There are a variety of arguments to be made, but the basic line is that within almost any animal species, genetic predispositions that favor closely related individuals and engender hostility to those who not as closely related can serve useful functions for individual and species survival. Intergroup competition and aggression help select for physical and mental abilities, and intragroup altruism helps to keep relatives alive long enough to breed and to preserve whatever genes there are for altruism at the group level (Melotti, 1987). The winners in wars and other forms of conflict often gain considerable prestige and reputation which protects them from future attack by others. Perhaps more to the point, collections of males (and most physical aggression, especially collective, is by males) may fight for access to women in other groups allowing them to spread their genes more widely (Buss, 1999).

However, such functionalist arguments do not prove genetic involvement. Ethnocentrism itself is probably a complex set of reactions -- cognitive, behavioral, and affective -- and may have limited commonalities with ethnocentric behaviors of various animals. At present there is little hard evidence of a major genetic component to ethnocentrism in humans. Nonetheless, important and interesting work continues in evolutionary psychology approaches to social behavior, and we would be well advised to keep an open mind about the various possibilities of biological mechanisms in this area.

**Psychoanalytic Models:** Freud (1921, 1930) argued that the natural antagonism of people toward one another must be submerged when one joins a group, and that such reductions of in-group hostility

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1 Aggression toward conspecifics is virtually universal among higher species (certainly mammals). However, among the millions of species only humans and chimpanzees form groups to commit violence against their own kind (Wrangman & Peterson, 1996).
must be bought by increasing libidinal ties to the group members. In other words the group must use libidinal ties (love, friendship, love of country) to inhibit a more basic hostility. However, the aggressive urges do not disappear. Since they cannot be directed against group members, they must be directed at those who are not members of the group. Hence, there is an intimate relationship between love of one's own group and hostility toward others.

**Conflict Models:** Ethnocentrism may be “natural” because it is somehow biologically mandated, but there are other ways to think about the “naturalness” of such behavior. For example, some forms of behavior are efficient responses to the physical, social, and cultural ecologies we all inhabit, and are likely to be widely and independently discovered. In other words out-group hostility may be ubiquitous not because of common genetic heritage but because of common discoveries of effective responses to common environmental demands.

Presumably early humans lived in a world of physical danger, limited and unreliable food resources, and competition for sexual partners where group living may have been an efficient solution to many problems. In addition, sexual and affectional bonds as well as demands of child-rearing probably encouraged people to live in family units. Once people live in groups, it is not difficult to imagine why they might have strong preferences for members of their own groups. They are likely to have had more contact with members of their own groups, and we know that familiarity leads to attraction (Zajonc, 1967). In-group members are likely to be similar to one another both because of genetic transmission due to in-breeding and because of cultural influences; we know that similarity leads to liking (Schneider, 1988). It is probable that one has more favorable and cooperative interactions with members of one's own group, another factor that would promote liking for fellow group members.

It is also not hard to explain why different groups might come into conflict. While groups may be more efficient at finding and preparing food, building shelters, and in protecting the young, there is still the insistent reality that in times of scarce resources groups as well as individuals must compete. While in-group competition may be muted, people from other groups might seem strange because of different language, customs, and dress, and there is no reason to dampen hostility toward them. Therefore even without making any strong assumptions about inherent aggressiveness or competitiveness in human nature, it still seems likely that people would come to prefer members of their own groups and to compete with, even aggress toward members of other groups.

There are many additional reasons why conflict should engender and exaggerate in-group bias. One motivational possibility is that conflict with others naturally makes us dislike them because we come to stress their negative qualities in trying to flag sources of potential harm. Or perhaps liking others that one may harm in some way creates cognitive dissonance which can best be reduced by coming to feel that one's competitors are worthy of the abuse one is about to heap upon them. There may also be cognitive explanations. Members of groups talk to one another and may well reinforce selective attention, labeling, and memory effects. In extreme cases, overt hatred of an enemy group may be the price of remaining in good stead in one's own group; for example concerns about the loyalty of citizens seems especially pronounced during times of war or other national crisis.

**Sherif:** While social scientists have commented on intergroup conflict for generations, the area became a major part of social psychology with the research of Muñif Sherif who studied the development of groups and group conflict among boys attending camps during three summers in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The 1954 Robbers Cave experiment (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961) was the best developed and is usually taken as prototypical. In this study previously unacquainted 11-year old boys came together at a summer camp. The boys played together and developed many friendships. Then they were divided arbitrarily into two groups, so that many of the boys now had close friends in the other group. In each case the groups of boys quickly achieved a high degree of group identity, achieving norms, leadership structures, and all the other qualities of groups; there was considerable pressure for boys to adhere to the norms of their respective groups. When the groups (now self-labeled as the "Rattlers" and the "Eagles") came together in a variety of games and competitive exercises, they not only competed fiercely but also began to denigrate the other group by name calling and the like. In due course members of the two groups would hardly speak to one another and there was
It is a comment of some sort that the former school now caters to the landed gentry outside Indianapolis, and the former is now a fairly typical urban high school with all the problems that implies.

In some ways the Sherif research was a powerful demonstration of how hostility between groups could arise. Some might argue that "boys will be boys", and perhaps this is no more than a demonstration of some pastel *Lord of the Flies* scenario. But I doubt that anyone seriously believes that this is anything like a total explanation. We all -- male and female, adult and child -- have found ourselves being unfair to and discriminating against those from other groups for no especially good reason other than the fact they have different group loyalties than we do. Students from one high school may criticize another for having lower class thugs but another for having upper class snobs. Having gone to a rural high school in Indiana where basketball rivalries are important, I can vividly remember our criticizing one neighboring school for being populated by hillbillies and plowboys and another for being too effete and not rural enough. There is abundant evidence that ethnocentric attitudes are, if not quite universal across cultures, certainly ubiquitous (Levine & Campbell, 1972; Brewer & Campbell, 1976) and that they increase during times of group conflict (e.g., Bar-Tal & Labin, 2001).

**Identity Theories**

**Social Identity Theory.** The most influential modern theory of in-group bias was developed by Henri Tajfel (Tajfel, 1969; 1970; 1981). In this theory, usually called Social Identity Theory (SIT), Tajfel claimed that social groups are important sources of identity. Obviously one will think about one's self in ways that do not involve explicit group membership (e.g., "I am smart", "I like opera"), but many of the answers to questions about who you are would involve references to explicit groups to which you belong. SIT also assumes that people generally want to feel positively about themselves, and that one (but not the only) way to accomplish this goal is to join groups that yield a positive identity or to increase the perceived worthiness of those groups to which one already belongs. Strictly speaking this model does not focus on hostility toward the out-group except as a by-product of the needs to see in-groups as positive. To the extent, then, that people want to think highly of themselves, they will want to think highly of their groups. In particular, people will be motivated to see as much difference between ingroup and out-group on dimensions that reflect positively on the in-group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In addition to cognitive differentiation people may also reinforce perceived differences behaviorally through adopting distinctive clothing styles or other emblems. Language, particularly slang, is often used as a means of differentiation (Giles & John son, 1987).

In Chapter 3 we discussed Tajfel's ideas about categorization, and they are also important here. Tajfel argued that the act of categorizing any set of objects tends to increase the perceived differences between categories and to make members of categories seem more alike. If we place ourselves and others into categories (groups) and are motivated to perceive our own groups as somehow better, it would also follow that we would be inclined to emphasize the ways in which other groups are different from us, especially along evaluative dimensions. Thus while categorization and in-group bias have independent cognitive bases, in everyday life they probably support one another to produce ethnocentrism.

**Self-Categorization Theory.** John Turner (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, Wetherell, 1987; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994) has broadened the theory in what has been called Self-Categorization Theory (SCT). This theory emphasizes more the cognitive components of group-based identities. Generally this theory emphasizes that the salience of group identities ebbs and flows depending on a host of situational and cognitive variables. Sometimes you are placed in a situation where your group membership is made salient by virtue of contrasts with other groups. When you are in a situation that emphasizes one of your group memberships, it will play a larger role in your momentary identity (cf. Hogg & Turner, 1987). So a Texan in Paris may discover hidden feelings for fellow Texans. Or you may be more aware of your gender identity when you are a minority in the group or be more aware of your occupation or social status when you are with people who are different than you. Like SIT,

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2 It is a commentary of some sort that the former school now caters to the landed gentry outside Indianapolis, and the former is now a fairly typical urban high school with all the problems that implies.
SCT also predicts that self-categorization tends to accentuate inter-class differences, and to reduce perceived differences between lawyers and doctors and tend to see lawyers as more alike than you might when your legal background is less salient. There is evidence that stereotypes of one’s own group as well as others change depending on what other groups are salient (Brewer, 1991; Hopkins & Murdock, 1999; Hopkins, Regan & Abell, 1997; Rutland & Cinnirella, 2000). It is also important to note that both theories have a range of application that extends well beyond inter-group conflict (Brown, 2000). For example, the theories make strong predictions about perceptions of status and inequality, as well as the importance of group loyalty, group cohesiveness and social influence within groups.

The Nature of Groups

Given the importance of various groups in our everyday lives, it seems natural to categorize people in terms of their group memberships. Still, it is important to recognize that this is far from automatic. There are several issues we must disentangle. One issue is whether people distinguish among different types of groups. Do we think differently about a group of students in a class from say a racial group such as Asian students at University of Arizona? Obviously groups differ, and we perceive them to do so, but what are the important differences?

What Constitutes a Group?

In Chapter 3 I made two important points of relevance to our present concerns. The first is that groups vary in their entitativity (Lickel, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2001). Transitory groups such as people waiting in an airport lounge are not likely to form the basis of stereotypes. However, sometimes such immediate, perceptual groups may diminish our stereotypes for other groupings. Suppose you notice a group of teenagers who are obviously on their way to or from a camp given their identical tee-shirts and caps. In focusing on this group of people who interest you momentarily, you may be relatively oblivious to the fact that it contains both males and females and people of various complexions and ethnic groups.

The second point made in Chapter 3 was that social categories are not the same as groups. Asian-Americans are a social category but not usually a group although they become one when they are salient in a particular situation or unite for concerted activity. Neither are all groups social categories. The members of the Undergraduate Admissions committee at my university are certain a group (and a hard-working one, as I can testify), but I hardly think of them as a category. In the present chapter our focus will be on groups, and more especially the ones that provide for social identity and generate inter-group conflict, although some of the research I consider will also relate more closely to social categories such as race and gender. Often the group-category distinction is fluid and depends on circumstances. People who live in Dallas is usually more a category than a group, but it can become a group to the extent I think about differences between Dallas and Houston residents or defend the virtues of Houston over Dallas.

More specifically we will focus on groups to which we explicitly belong or don’t belong: in-groups and out-groups. Usually such membership is fairly clear-cut, but sometimes we might wonder about what groups are in-groups and which are out-groups. Obviously for a liberal, conservatives constitute an out-group. But what is the relevant out-group for Jews? All non-Jews? Christians? Muslims? If I am a supporter of Ralph Nader, are both Democrats and Republicans out-groups? I teach at Rice; does that mean that those who teach at Michigan or Iowa State are members of out-groups?

Contexts: Obviously what counts as a relevant and salient out-group varies from situation to situation. Haslam and Turner (1992) have argued that such distinctions depend in part on differences between the groups as well as frames of reference. For a constant difference between two groups on some trait, the two groups will be seen as closer together the larger the range of positions seen as relevant. So a moderate conservative will see the moderate liberal as closer when there are a full range of political views represented from the ultra-right to the radical liberal than when there are only moderate points of view represented. People are also more willing to stereotype the other when he was seen as further away, as more of an out-grouper. Turner’s SCT emphasizes that group-based identity is very much a product of the context in which are groups are located.
The Relevance of Groups. Lalonde and Gardner (1989) remind us that only those groups that are relevant will be seen as fit for stereotyping. I recognize that people who were born and live in Chicago constitute a group to which I do not belong, and now that I think about it Chicagoans probably do have at least some characteristics in common. However, I have few if any definitive stereotypes about Chicagoans, living as I do in Texas. On the other hand, I do have stereotypes about people who live in Dallas, stereotypes that are probably not shared by most Midwesterners who are blissfully ignorant of rivalries between various Texas cities. Because relevance is often confounded with knowledge and familiarity, there is an important lesson for those who claim that the answer is stereotyping is more contact and knowledge about other groups. With greater familiarity and knowledge also comes relevance, so the net result may be that a group that one knows well is seen in more stereotypic terms than a group less well known and hence less relevant. Several studies (e.g., Biernat & Crandall, 1994; Berry, 1970; Taft, 1959; Vinacke, 1956) confirm this somewhat counter-intuitive idea.

Group Identification

Thus, what counts as an out-group may vary from situation to situation. What about in-groups? I belong to countless groups. The fact that I just renewed my Masterpiece I series subscription to the Houston Symphony makes me a member of a group that actually meets 9 times a year on Sunday afternoons. Yet, despite the fact that I recognize and even speak to several fellow Masterpiece I subscribers, I feel no particular identification with this group. As a consequence I have no special feelings about the subscribers to Masterpiece II or the full season, or non-subscribers or those who prefer season tickets to the ballet rather than the symphony. On the other hand, I do feel some identification with my college alumni group (although I draw the line at wearing silly hats and tee-shirts), and consequently still catch myself feeling that students and alumni from the rival college are not quite fully human. I feel even more identification with my neighborhood group, taking both pride in the group and having some vague sense that other neighborhoods aren’t quite as nice. At times I identify with my academic discipline particularly when I represent psychology in a meeting of other social scientists. I become a fervent social scientist when I am in a group of physical scientists, a liberal arts kind of guy when I talk to engineers and business school people, and a complete academic when I am in a group of insurance salesmen. Liberals and conservatives do battle in the American Congress over foreign policy but become part of a larger group of Americans when we are engaged in war.

When we identify with a group, the self tends to ingest ingroup features as a part of identity (Brewer, 1991). One implication is that people should be quicker and more facile in making judgment about the self when group and individual features agree, a prediction confirmed for both traits (Smith & Henry, 1996; Smith, Coats, & Walling, 1999) and attitudes (Smith, Claypool, & Banner, 2000).

Need Satisfaction. One obvious factor that determines group identification is how well the group satisfies basic needs. It would as no surprise to discover that people identify with their business organization more when they are making rapid promotion progress. Identification with organizations depends, in part, on how positively other people are perceived to value the organization and the extent to which the organization stereotypes are positive (Bergami & Bagozzi, 2000). As one might expect we also tend to identify more with high status than with low status groups (Ellemers, Doosje, Van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1992; Ellemers, Van Knippenberg, De Vries, & Wilke, 1988). Different people have different goals and agendas for their lives and presumably value those groups that help them meet these goals. So I regard college alumni groups as being faintly silly, but others wear funny hats at alumni meetings and seem to take them quite seriously indeed. Some groups I join, others seem forced upon me. People who freely choose their groups as well as those relatively high in authoritarianism and ethnocentrism seem especially prone to strong identifications (Perreault & Bourhis, 1999).

However, the nice woman who called about renewal tried to make me feel that this was a special group: "Our renewals for Sunday afternoons are running a bit ahead of last year. Won’t you join your fellow subscribers and help us meet our goal for Masterpiece I early?" Nice try. I did renew but not because I have any positive feelings about this group. Honest.
**Salience:** Our group memberships are likely more salient in some situations than in others. Minority status is one such factor. Being in a racial or gender minority makes these categories more salient (Cota & Dion, 1986; McGuire, McGuire, & Winton; McGuire, McGuire, Child, & Fujikoka, 1978; McGuire & Padawer-Singer, 1976). Group identification may be affected by many other factors in everyday life. For example, identification with one's ethnic group may be a function, in part, of social class (Phinney, 1990), and generally people seem to identify more with groups that are in a numerical minority (Simon & Brown, 1987).

**Optimal Distinctiveness Theory:** Marilyn Brewer (1991) argues that our social identities fulfill two somewhat incompatible goals. On the one hand people want to be a part of groups, to feel similar to others as a means of self-validation. This is, of course, the linchpin of SCT, and our in-groups generally satisfy this need. On the other hand, people want to feel unique, as special, and this leads to inter-group comparison and sometimes to out-group derogation. Thus, I might identify with my particular university being content to see myself as “at one” with my colleagues and students, but at the same time see myself as quite different from faculty at a neighboring university.

According to Brewer people strive to identify with groups that provide an optimal level of inclusiveness that satisfies both needs. How ever, what is optimal may vary from time to time, context to context. I may come to feel cognitively smothered by being a generic faculty member at my university and derive little satisfaction from comparisons with those at other institutions. In that case I may identify with my academic department and compare my plight with members of other academic departments at my university. Or I may feel cramped by being able to identify only with my institution and may chose to identify with professors everywhere and see myself as distinctive from lawyers or physicians.

Generally when assimilation needs are salient we tend to perceive intragroup similarity as higher (Pickett & Brewer, 2001) and to prefer larger, more inclusive groups (Pickett, Silver, & Brewer, 2002). Alternatively when distinctiveness needs are more paramount, people see less ingroup similarity (Simon, Greenberg, Arndt, Pyszczynski, Clement, & Solomon, 1997) and prefer smaller, more exclusive groups (Pickett, Silver, & Brewer, 2002).

**Identification is Multidimensional:** Obviously identification with groups is multidimensional and complex and satisfies multiple needs. One might identify with group goals, group achievements, the group as an entity, the other members, group prestige. You can take pride in a group or not, like its members or hate them, enjoy what the group does or not. Several people (e.g., Deaux, 1993; Frable, 1997; Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, & Crook, 1989; Karasawa, 1991; Sanders Thompson, 2001; Sellers, Smith, Shelton, Rowley, & Chavous, 1998) have argued that group identification is indeed multidimensional. The most comprehensive attempt to examine this empirically (Jackson & Smith, 1999) showed that there are several aspects to identity: attraction to the group, interdependency (a sense that the group’s fate is one’s own), depersonalization (the sense that one is absorbed in the group so that members are more or less interchangeable), and intergroup context (a tendency to see one’s own group identity in contrast to other groups). They argue that those with secure group identification will be attracted to the group but will not have high levels of depersonalization and interdependency. Insecure attachment, by contrast, is based on high levels of attraction and both depersonalization and interdependency. Examination of relationships among several measures of identification supported this notion. Furthermore those who were securely attached showed less in-group bias than those who were insecurely attached.

**In-Group Bias**

**In-Group Favoritism**

Questions of whether we give preferential treatment and evaluate more positively those in our own groups has been a major theme for social psychology during the past decade or more. This has been especially true for British and Australian social psychology, heavily influenced by the work of Henri Tajfel and his student, John Turner.
The Tajfel Approach

Much of the modern research on in-group and out-group effects has been built on the research of Henri Tajfel and his students. Tajfel considered two closely related themes. The first, and theoretically most fundamental, was his concern with how categorization into groups affected our perceptions of self and others. In Chapter 3 we discussed his theory that categorization of people into groups would increase inter-group differences and reduce intra-group differences, and will return to this theme later in this chapter. The second theme was his concern that people favor members from their own groups even when the basis of group membership is weak or arbitrary, and that is the focus of this chapter.

The Minimal Group Situation: Tajfel was clear that the effects he was discussing were cognitive albeit with a strong motivational push. In-group bias is certain readily apparent among businesses, countries, racial groups, and athletic teams. In every day groups, it is hard to know how much of the effects are cognitive and how much due to social pressure and other motivational factors. For example, is it any surprise that a member of a college fraternity believes that his group is superior to another fraternity? His fraternity competes with other fraternities in athletic, leadership, decorating, and (we can hope) academic endeavors. Surely his fraternity group has put a great deal of pressure on the young man to believe that his frat is superior in all ways that count. Furthermore in everyday life, there are usually self-selection factors on the basis of attitudes and values. Most of us join only groups to which we already have some sympathy. People may be asked to leave groups if they cannot support the basic program. So there are many reasons why members of existing groups show favoritism toward their own.

Tajfel thought that “beneath” these effects was a more fundamental process, built on the idea that important parts of our identities are anchored in our groups. We want to differentiate our own groups from others, and enhance in-group worthiness which helps to maintain self-esteem. With that in mind he wanted to study these basic processes without the messiness of these social and motivational factors we have just been discussing. He began his research with what is now called the "minimal group" paradigm. Subjects are arbitrarily divided into two groups (say on the basis of personality patterns or even artistic preferences); the basis of division can be as arbitrary and devoid of psychological meaning as one wishes, and generally the “group” members have not met each other. Then subjects are asked to assign points (sometimes representing money) to other people who are identified only by their group membership; so a person who has been categorized as an A will be asked to assign points to a person identified as an A and to a person identified as a member of B. People do not themselves benefit directly from their assignment of points although they may, of course, benefit from the assignments of others.

The distribution is done in terms of a defined matrix, and the matrix is set up such that a variety of reward structures are possible. For example, to give a simplified example, imagine that the subjects must choose between giving 7 points to a member of their own group and only 1 point to the out-group versus 19 to their own group and 25 to the out-group. Now it is obvious that if a given individual wants to maximize the outcomes of his own group, he should pick the latter, and often people do. But they also often pick distributions such as the former which provide the maximum in-group differentiation, even if that means members of their own group will get fewer total points. In general, subjects in this sort of situation show in-group favoritism, despite the fact that the in-group has been arbitrarily and recently created and despite the absence of any meaningful contact with other group members or competition with the out-group (Brewer, 1979; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992).

The particular choices given to subjects in the Tajfel paradigm are somewhat complex to describe, but the effect can be replicated with much simpler ways of measuring in-group favoritism such as assignment of traits (Doise, Csepeli, Dann, Gouge, Larsen, & Ostell, 1972) and even with implicit measures of stereotyping (Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Monteth, 2001; Otten & Moskowitz, 2000; Otten & 4 When you think about it one of the most extraordinary examples is the attachment people have to sports teams from their universities and cities. Many people seem to invest a great deal of emotion in whether “their” teams win or lose even though those outcomes have little or no effect on them in other ways. See further discussion on p. 28.
Wentura, 1999); the general pattern of in-group favoritism or bias seems beyond dispute and does not depend fundamentally on a particular measurement strategy.

The effect itself is robust. A vast amount of research has accumulated on in-group bias, stimulated by Tajfel's initial research (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). In-group bias has been demonstrated with people from several nationalities and with children as young as 6 (Bigler, Jones, & Lobliner, 1997; Nesdale & Flessa, 2001). It is also clear that it can be demonstrated with the most minimal of random group assignments (Locksley, Ortiz, & Hepburn, 1980).

**Positive-Negative Asymmetry.** Social Identity Theory is clear that the primary motive is enhancement of one's own group and only secondarily the derogation of out-groups. As SIT would predict the in-group bias effect is largely controlled by greater favoritism for the in-group as opposed to hostility toward the out-groups (Brewer, 1979); this is sometimes called the positive-negative asymmetry effect. Furthermore, while this effect is generally found when individuals are distributing rewards, there is no strong in-group bias effect when punishments or other negative outcomes are dispensed (e.g., Mummendey, 1995). However, when social identity is threatened, in-group bias appears for both allocation of rewards and punishments (Otten, Mummendey, & Blanz, 1996). To some extent this may be a function of normative expectations that it is better to reward than to punish differentially (Blanz, Mummendey, & Otten, 1997). Or perhaps when assigning costs members of the in-group have to compare themselves with the out-group on negative features which implies that the in-group is not perfectly wonderful (Reynolds, Turner, & Haslam, 2000).

**Is Social Identity All There Is?** While Tajfel's SIT has dominated thinking about in-group bias for over two decades, others (e.g., Cadini & Rothbart, 1996; Hong & Harrod, 1988; Horowitz & Rabbie, 1989; Ng, 1981; Rabbie, Schot, & Visser, 1989) have criticized the theory as a putatively complete explanation for the effects and have offered alternative explanations. For example, Lowell Gaertner and Chester Insko (2000) have raised the issue of whether the minimal group paradigm is as minimal as the name implies. Recall that the logic behind the Minimal Group Paradigm requires that the only factor operating is categorization. However, in most experimental tests subjects not only allocate but also receive rewards from other in-group and out-group members. In that case subjects may give more rewards to in-group members because they hope and expect that their allocations will be reciprocated. Alternatively, they fear that they will be discriminated against by out-group subjects, and therefore over-allocate to their own group as a way of restoring some equality (see also Moy & Ng, 1996).

Other norms may also play a role; for example, those who construe the positive allocations as bonuses tend to show more in-group bias than those who construe them as payments because the former are more strongly governed by norms of fairness (Gaertner & Insko, 2001). Needs to perceive one's self as fair (Singh, Choo, & Poh, 1998) tend to decrease in-group bias whereas group loyalty norms increase it (Hertel & Kerr, 2001). So even the minimal situation is not devoid of motives other than those surrounding seeking a positive identity.

**Factors Affecting In-Group Bias**

While Tajfel has stressed an important reason for in-group bias, the kinds of effects found in minimal groups do not necessarily underlie all or even most examples of in-group favoritism in the real world. It seems highly unlikely, for example, that the ethnic conflicts we see in Bosnia or Israeli-Arab fighting can be entirely reduced to preferences for in-group members based on minimal information (and Tajfel would have agreed wholeheartedly). The tendency for effects in the minimal group situation to be localized in favoring the in-group rather than derogating the out-group also does not speak to the hatred that underlies so much group conflict in the world (Mummendey, 1995).

The value of the minimal group paradigm is that it aids studying one of the most important motives for in-group bias, motives which may be hard to disentangle from other more obvious motives in the complexities of everyday life. Further it suggests that it does not require a great deal of cultural or psychological trapping to set off the in-group bias. Seeking a positive social identity is a fundamental, base-line sort of motivation which can become a foundation for more extreme forms.

**Conflict and Competition.** The most obvious prediction from almost any theory is that conflict and competition should make in-group bias stronger. SIT offers a straightforward explanation. When a
group is threatened by an out-group, derogation of the outgroup and enhancement of the ingroup promotes a positive self-evaluation which is presumably anchored in group identity (Brewer, 1979). Conflict may lead to stronger in-group bias because group members are trying to impress fellow in-group members or to solidify their standing in the group (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999). On the other hand, when people feel secure in their attachment to and identification with the group, motivation to derogate the outgroup may be lessened. Even subliminal priming of attachment feelings with such words as “closeness” “hug” and “support” has this effect. (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001).

Research using samples of people during actual conflict suggests that negative stereotypes (presumably closely related to evaluative bias) are more prevalent during times of conflict. Negative stereotypes of outgroups are usually quite pronounced during wars and other national conflicts (Buchanan, 1951; Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Hayes, 1992; Meenes, 1943; Seago, 1947). Also among Arab students in Lebanon Moslems tend to have more negative stereotypes of Jews than do Christians perhaps because of the greater historic conflicts between Muslims and Jews (Diab, 1962).^5^ While we are often threatened by the beliefs and behavior of members of out-groups, it is possible that hostility toward out-groups may increase because of the frustration arising from external threat or economic hard-times (Chadwick-Jones, 1962). According to scapegoat theory frustration is a major instigator of aggression, and when this cannot be directed at the direct cause it may be displaced onto a scapegoat (Doob, Dollard, Miller, Mowrer, and Sears, 1939). While scapegoating theory has fallen on hard times in part because it was vague about such details as which outgroup would be chosen for the displaced aggression. However, economic hard times do tend to be correlated with violence, and in one famous study of lynchings of blacks in the South during the first part of this century, lynchings did increase as the price of cotton went down (Hovland & Sears, 1940). More recent studies have shown that threat in the form of mortality salience increases in-group bias as well as identification (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002) although it may decrease identification with negative ingroups (Arndt, Greenberg, Schimel, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2002).

Superordinate Groups: Recall that in the original Sherif research once the competing groups discovered superordinate goals, inter-group competition and bias seemed to be inhibited. One possible reason suggested by Sherif is that cooperation simply makes people think of themselves in terms of a larger superordinate group membership. So hostility directed to former outgroup members might be reduced as people from competing groups are cognitively welcomed into the larger in-group. Research by Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, and Dovidio (1989) shows that reclassifying former competing groups as one larger group reduced in-group bias because the former out-group members were seen in more positive terms. Second, cooperation tends to make people from competing groups think of themselves partially in terms of superordinate group membership (Gaertner, Dovidio, Rust, Nier, Banker, Ward, Mottola, & Houllette, 1999; Gaertner, Mann, Dovidio, Murrell, & Pomare, 1990).

There are, however, some downsides to this strategy. For one thing having two formerly competing groups unite for the purposes of dealing with mutual external threat or superordinate outgroup may not reduce the amount of violence and discrimination but merely redirect it (Kessler & Mummendey, 2001). Second, dissolving boundaries between rival groups can be quite threatening. Psychological boundaries and negative evaluations built up over decades or centuries cannot easily be erased. We might find perceptions of similarity to a rival out-group threatening, and this ought to be especially threatening when there is conflict and can lead to even greater in-group bias (Henderson-King, Henderson-King, Zhermer, Posokhova, & Chiken, 1997). Some research (e.g., Hornsey & Hogg, 1999) suggests that more in-group bias is displayed when superordinate groups are seen to be inclusive. SIT

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5 Obviously such stereotypes may be outdated, but the general point is still valid – political relations between countries affect the stereotypes of their citizens. As I write this Americans are bombing targets in Afghanistan for what a majority consider to be valid and moral reasons, and Americans are rejoicing in their new and improved self-image. However, it is doubtful the bombing will lead to a more positive stereotypes of Americans globally.
proposes that under these circumstances maintaining the salience of pre-existing subordinate as well as the new superordinate categories may be crucial (Hornsey & Hogg, 2000c). We may be able to have our cake and eat it too when the sub-groups have different levels of expertise that can be emphasized as supports for previous subordinate group identities (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998).

Generally, however, encouraging people in different groups to think of themselves as part of one group discourages ingroup bias. Another strategy is cognitively exactly the opposite. Perhaps superordinate goals encourage thinking of others in more individualistic terms. Other become less "people from that other group" and more like "us" with all our glorious individuality; this might reduce bias (Neuberg & Fiske, 1987). Several studies (e.g., Dovidio, Gaertner, Validzic, Matoja, Johnson, & Frazier, 1997; Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989; Wilder, 1978b) have shown that this strategy is effective; interestingly it seems to occur primarily because the overly positive ratings of in-group members are reduced (Gaertner, et al, 1989). On the other hand, when group categories are salient, SIT predicts that in-group bias might be increased when people can easily compare with out-group members because of comparable roles (Deschamps & Brown, 1983 – see also Chapter 10).

Identification: In recent years there has been a tendency to emphasize identification with the group as an important mediator of in-group bias. A person who is weakly identified with a group will probably not be especially motivated to differentiate this particular ingroup from various outgroups. I may belong to a book reading group that meets four times a year, but since it forms a trivial part of my self-concept, have little reason to elevate its standing, let alone derogate other groups. When the group is threatened or criticized, I may find it easier to leave the group than to defend it. By contrast those people who identify strongly with a group or who see themselves as a prototypic group member (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997a) should be highly motivated to make sure it seems to be the best there is.

As might be expected, people who identify more with their groups tend to be more committed and attached to them and have less desire to feel free to leave the group (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997). They also perceive more in-group homogeneity (Hortaçsu, 2000), conform more strongly to group norms (Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002), have more positive stereotypes of the in-group (Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999; Schmitt & Maes, 2002), and see themselves as a more typical group member, what is usually called self-stereotyping (Tropp & Wright, 2001).

So identification affects a variety of attitudes about the in-group, but what of out-group attitudes and behaviors? While early research was not strongly supportive of SIT’s predicted relationship between in-group identification and inter-group discrimination (Hinkle & Brown, 1990), there are now several reports of significant relationships (e.g., Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998; Guimond, 2000; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997b; Perreault & Bourhis, 1999; Verkuyten, Drabbs, & Nieuwenhuijzen, 1999; Wann & Branscombe, 1995). People who identify with a group, but who have rather peripheral status, may be especially prone to urge out-group derogation, especially when their evaluations are public, as a way of bolstering their perceived commitment to the group (Noel, Wann, & Branscombe, 1995).

For SCT the act of categorizing one’s self as a group member involves a kind of depersonalization where one relates to others in terms of common group goals rather than individual identities. Thus identification should be related to perceptions of in-group homogeneity as well as self-stereotyping especially when the ingroup is threatened. Generally research supports the idea that threat affects those who are the most highly identified with the group. In particular they are the most likely to self-stereotype (i.e., see themselves as a prototypic group member), to see the ingroup as more homogeneous, to display more in-group bias, and to stereotype the out-group more (Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997, 1999).

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6 Turner (1999) one of the authors of the mature form of SIT denies that the theory makes such an explicit prediction to this effect. However, it is clearly consistent with the general model (Brown, 2000).
Self-Stereotyping: Self-stereotyping is the tendency to see one’s self as similar to the other group members or to endorse ingroup stereotypes, and while it is closely related to identification, some (e.g., Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997) have argued that it is the stronger causal player in ingroup bias. Self-stereotyping has been found to be the more powerful predictor of in-group bias especially under conditions in which group identity is threatened (Verkuylten & Nekuee, 1999). Self-stereotyping is more common in smaller groups and for minority groups when they have higher status (Simon & Hamilton, 1994). Also self-stereotyping tends to be strong when group identity is threatened on important issues (Burris & Jackson, 2000).

A dilemma is likely to arise when the in-group is viewed negatively by others. In that case one might argue that group identities are especially threatened and group members thereby highly likely to self-stereotype. On the other hand, taking on the mantle of such a negative group means that one is endorsing a negative identity. In one study (Biernat, Vescio, & Green, 1996) sorority and fraternity members resolved the dilemma by accepting the validity of the largely negative stereotypes of these groups in general but accepting only the positive aspects and rejecting the negative as characteristic of their own fraternities and sororities. However, those who are highly identified with their negative groups may self-stereotype as a way of satisfying both assimilation and differentiation needs (Pickett, Bonner, & Coleman, 2002).

If you think about it, many subordinate groups in our society are caught in a bind when it comes to forging an identity. To the extent that the norms and values of their group differ from those of the larger society, self-stereotyping can lead to acceptance by the minority in-group but at the cost of rejection by the larger society. One solution would be to devalue the dimensions on which one’s low status group is disadvantaged, and this occurs especially when the disadvantage is seen as illegitimate (Schmader, Major, Eccleston, & McCoy, 2001). In some cases in-group pressures may be more important than those from the larger society. For example, Fordham and Ogbu (1986) suggest that black students with high academic aspirations and abilities may be accused by their classmates of selling out to white values and “acting white”. Many will, of course, continue to do well academically, but others will be unwilling to make the sacrifice of cultural identity that this may entail. Such effects are not limited to ethnic minorities. The negative attitudes many women have toward math are caused in part with their identification with their gender and the perception that math is a male thing (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002).

Entitativity: Entitativity (discussed earlier: chapter 3, p. 9) may be closely related to identification and/or self-stereotyping constructs we have just been considering. Gaertner and Schopler (1998) argue that in-group bias is another consequence of perceived entitativity. When groups perceive themselves as a distinct group, they will tend to favor the in-group more although not necessarily to evaluate the out-group more negatively. They manipulated entitativity by the amount and quality of interaction that groups members had with one another. Those with the most interaction not only perceived themselves to belong to more entitative groups but displayed more in-group (but not out-group) bias. Furthermore the perceptions of entitativity largely mediated the effects of group interaction on in-group bias.

Crisscross classification: In-group is typically reduced when classification becomes more complex by introducing new sub-groups or group categorizations that criss-cross reduces the bias (Bettencourt & Dorr, 1998; Brewer, Ho, Lee, & Miller, 1987; Brown & Turner, 1979; Commis & Lockwood, 1978; Deschamps & Doise, 1978; Hagendoorn & Henke, 1991; Marcus-Newall, Miller, Holtz, & Brewer, 1993; Urban & Miller, 1998). It is worth stressing again that we are all members of many groups, and sometimes this messes up clean in-group/out-group discriminations. For example, how does a black female view a white female who is a member of a racial out-group but a gender in-group?

Several patterns of response make sense. The most obvious is that a kind of additive effect where groups are rejected in proportion to their “out-groupness”. Several studies have found exactly this pattern where people reject the double out-group more than the double-in-group with the mixed groups in between (Crisp & Hewstone, 1999a; Hewstone, Islam, & Judd, 1993; Migdal, Hewstone, & Mullen, 1998; Urban & Miller, 1998). Obviously a lot depends on what the crisscrossed categories are, specially
how important they are to the person. To take an extreme example, it is doubtful that a Palestinian would reject an Israeli Jew less by finding out that they share a hobby of raising tropical fish.

Other patterns have also been reported (Crisp & Hewstone, 1999b), the most common of which is social inclusion, where people equally like groups with which they have at least one membership. This is precisely what one might hope, of course: a black female would feel bonds not only with other black females but with black males and white females, rejecting only white males. Unfortunately there are also reports of the opposite where a person is rejected if he is a part of either out-group or both. The other bad news is that double in-group difference from the double out-group or either of the in-group/out-group combinations is greater than the single in-group/out-group comparison. Nonetheless, most studies indicate that crisscross categorization is at least moderately effective in reducing in-group bias.

**Self-Esteem:** Social Identity Theory and some versions of common sense suggest that self-esteem and group identification have a basic relationship in the sense that one's self-esteem is partially dependent on evaluation of groups to which one belongs. Two general predictions follow. The first is that derogating people in out-groups or elevating the positive features of one's own group raises self-esteem. The second is that people who have low self-esteem might be more inclined to show in-group bias as a way of raising it. It seems reasonable that I can improve the lot of my group psychologically through in-group bias, my own positive self-worth would improve to the extent it is dependent on group identification. Tests of these propositions have not been uniformly successful.

**Does In-Group Bias Raise Self-Esteem?** Studies examining the first question as to whether the experience of showing in-group bias actually raises self-esteem have provided mixed support with most studies finding support (e.g., Fine & Spencer, 1997; Hunter, Platow, Bell, Kypri, & Lewis, 1997; Major, Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998; Mullin & Hogg, 1995; Schmader & Major, 1999), but others finding none (Hogg & Turner, 1985a, 1985b). Reviews (e.g., Long & Spears, 1997; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998) of research in this area have concluded that identifying with one's own group and seeing it as better than relevant out-groups does generally contribute to high self-esteem.

**Does Self-Esteem Affect In-Group Bias?** The second proposition that people with low self-esteem might be particularly prone to showing in-group bias has been supported in some studies (e.g., Fein & Spencer, 1997; Platow, Harley, Hunter, Hanning, Shave, & O’Connell, 1997), but not in others (Brochner & Chen, 1996; Crocker, Thompson, Mcgraw, & Ingerman, 1987; Seta & Seta, 1992, 1996). Obviously things are more complex than they seem on the surface. One complication is that while it makes sense that people with low self-esteem would boost a fragile sense of worth by derogating others, the opposite also meets the common sense test. Perhaps people with high self-esteem have been able to maintain their self-worth by derogating others (Crocker, Thompson, Mcgraw, & Ingerman, 1987). So which is it? Is it high or low self-esteem people who are the most prone to in-group bias? A recent meta-analysis (Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000) found that it was the high self-esteem folks, but only when they were making direct evaluative ratings.

Another complication is that self-esteem may encompass several distinct states, and self-esteem based on individual features and on group memberships differ in many ways (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Bettencourt & Hume, 1999; Gaertner, Sedikides, & Graetz, 1999; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). In fairness to SIT, predictions based on individual self-esteem are not especially relevant, because it is the sense of self that is anchored in group identification that is crucial (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1989; Turner, 1999). For example, Long, Spears, and Manstead (1994) found that people low in collective self-esteem and high in personal self-esteem tended to display more in-group bias.

**Status and Power:** Other studies have manipulated self-esteem indirectly through manipulations of the status, power, or success of the groups although there are legitimate concerns about their

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Turner (1999) has argued forcefully that SIT does not make such explicit claims, and he is correct. Nonetheless the predictions are clearly consistent with the model, and much research has been stimulated by Hogg and Abrams’ (1990) analysis along these lines.
psychological equivalence (Abrams & Hogg, 1988). Failing or having low status may not be the same thing at all as having low chronic self-esteem.

Most of the research in this area has examined the status of the groups. Some studies show more in-group bias with relatively lower status groups (e.g., Brauer, 2001; Wagner, Lampen, & Syllwasschy, 1986), but others have found the opposite effect (e.g., Ellemers, Kortaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990). Meta-analyses of relevant studies found more in-group bias for lower status groups, (Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, & Hume, 2001; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). Low status groups discriminate more on dimensions unrelated to status (Reichl, 1997) and tend to devalue dimensions along which their low status is based (Major, Spencer, Schmaeder, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998; Schmader & Major, 1999).

One problem is that members of low status groups may be subjected to competing pressures. On the one hand, they want to buffer their own vulnerable self-esteem by seeing their group as especially positive. On the other hand, they are also cognizant of the higher status of the other group and its presumed better qualities. Jost (in press; & Banaji, 1994) has called this system justification – the tendency of disadvantaged groups to internalize the beliefs and attitudes (including stereotypes) of the larger social system. For high status groups, of course, both factors should contribute to in-group bias. Research by Jost & Burgess (2000) does show that existing low status groups do display less in-group bias than high status groups especially when the legitimacy of status differences were salient (and presumably system justification pressures maximized).

Summary: Thus, neither part of the self-esteem hypothesis receives strong and consistent support from the research literature. It would, however, be wrong to conclude that self-esteem never plays a role for in-group bias. Probably many of us have had the experience of derogating others who are different just to make ourselves feel better and in finding that it seems to work at least for a brief period of time. Generally at the moment, there seems to be more support for the idea that inter-group discrimination raises self-esteem than for the idea that low self-esteem motivates discrimination (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998).

Salience: Another strong prediction from SIT is that in-group bias should be increased when one's own group becomes salient. One reason groups might become salient in everyday life is because they are small or otherwise in a minority, and several studies have shown that in-group bias is increased when one's group becomes more salient by virtue of its being small relative size (Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992). Other contextual variables may also be important. For example, in-group bias in the minimal group paradigm is essentially eliminated when there are three groups rather than the usual two, perhaps because multiple groups reduce the salience of group membership (Hartstone & Augoustinos, 1995).

Attribute Relevance: Surely people do not think their own group is superior to others on every dimension. I may concede that your university excels in art and sculpture, but reserve claims of superiority for mine for the more important (at least to me) psychology or the social sciences. Mummendey and Schreiber (1983, 1984) have referred to this as the "different but better" strategy. The claim is that in-groups will claim superiority on those dimensions most relevant to the in-group and concede superiority on less relevant items. Despite the reasonableness of this idea and some supporting evidence (e.g., Mummendey & Simon, 1989; Schmader & Major, 1999), Mullen, Brown, and Smith's (1992) meta-analysis found that it is generally not true across studies. When the ingroup has relatively high status, this relationship is found, but the reverse seems to be true when the in-group status is low.

Evaluating Individuals

The bulk of the research done under the rubric of identity models focuses on evaluations of ingroups and out-groups as undifferentiated collections or of generic individuals. Yet everyday experience suggests that we often make sharp distinctions among people in both types of groups. I may think that professors at my university are generally superior to those at a neighboring institution but still eagerly recognize superior talent there and deadwood here. Thus, in evaluating specific members of in-groups and out-groups other motives may come into play.
The Black Sheep Effect: Common experience suggests that often we are often more annoyed with people in our own groups than with others. Think about how you might regard a member of your own university’s football team person caught cheating versus a football player from another university. You might be prone to argue that since players from the other school are of lower morality than players from your own, it is not surprising that the other team produces more than its share of scoundrels. But seeing one of your own exposed is embarrassing.

In what José Marques and his colleagues (Marques & Paez, 1999) have called this the “black sheep effect”, unlikeable members of one’s own group are evaluated more negatively than unlikeable members of an out-group (Marques, 1990; Marques, Robalo, & Rocha, 1992; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988). For example, when white perceivers evaluate the performance of black and white targets, they tend to be especially hard on under-achieving whites (Biemot, Vescio, & Billings, 1999). Marques also argues that in-group members who perform especially well or who are quite likeable would be evaluated more positively than similar outgroup members. The net result is that evaluations of ingroup members would be polarized relative to those of outgroup folks. In support within one’s own gender strong applicants are evaluated more positively and weak less positively than similar performers from the other gender (Jackson & Hymes, 1985).

Out-Group Polarization: The Black Sheep Effect applies to evaluations of in-group members, but we may also differentiate sharply among members of out-groups. Although we may derogate out-groups generally, sometimes we evaluate members of out-groups especially highly. I’m sometimes struck but what I think is a tendency to over-praise athletes who do well in my classes and may evaluate their performance more highly than that of non-athletes who do as well. Unfortunately it’s also easy to dismiss the poor academic performance of an athlete because, “he’s just a dumb jock”, and give him even less credit than he deserves. There demonstrations that evaluations of out-group members are polarized – those who perform well are seen as especially praiseworthy and those who perform poorly as especially negative (Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, & Eisenstadt, 1991; Linville, 1982; Linville & Jones, 1980).

There are several explanations for this effect. Attitude ambivalence theory (Katz, 1981) explains such effects in terms of ambivalent attitudes that people often have toward members of out-groups. For example, White Americans may genuinely like many Black Americans but also feel a sense of disgust or wariness about them. This ambivalence leads to feelings of discomfort. When they have positive experiences with a black person, the positive part of their attitudes become more salient, and the reduction of the ambivalence created discomfort may then amplify that positive reaction. Similar effects, mutatis mutandi, operate with negative experiences. Linville (1982) has advanced a more cognitive explanation usually termed the extremity-complexity model. She has argued that we generally have more complex representations of people and groups we know well, that in-groups are generally more familiar than out-groups, and that more extreme evaluations (both positive and negative) are likely to occur for less complex representations (such as those we hold for less familiar out-groups).

Reconciliation: The Black Sheep hypothesis argues that evaluations of ingroup members should be polarized relative to those from the outgroup whereas the extremity-complexity model argues that ratings of outgroup members should be more polarized. One can easily generate examples that seem to support both models, but obviously in a given situation both cannot be true although, of course each may yield successful predictions in different circumstances or situations. To complicate matters even more expectancy-violation theory (Jussim, Coleman, & Lerch, 1987) predicts that people who violate expectancies will be evaluated extremely, and if we assume that most people have more negative expectations of outgroup than ingroup members the theory predicts that with good performance the outgroup person will be evaluated more positively than the ingroup and with poor performance the ingroup person will be evaluated more negatively than the outgroup person. There are also data consistent with this hypothesis (e.g., Bettencourt, Dill, Greathouse, Charlton, & Mulholland, 1997; Coleman, Jussim & Kelly, 1995). The predictions of the three models are provided in Table 7.1. Obviously there are data supporting each model, and at the moment it is unclear which model works best in which circumstances.
Table 7.1: Predictions of various models for ingroup and outgroup evaluation polarizati

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<td>Positive</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Black Sheep</strong></td>
<td>Highly Positive</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Extremity-Complexity</strong></td>
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**Cognitive Effects**

Up to this point we have focused on in-group/out-group bias, and the focus has naturally been on affective responses such as evaluative ratings, reward allocations, and hostility. However, our primary focus in this book is on stereotypes. Let us now turn to how group assignment affects how traits and other dispositions are assigned to people as a function of group membership.

**Traits and Dispositions**

**In-Group/Out-Group Ratings**: Everyday experience suggests that we are particularly likely to ascribe stereotypic traits to members of out-groups. This has been found in several studies (e.g., Brigham, 1974; Hewstone, Jaspars, & Lalljee, 1982; Jones, Wood, & Quattrone, 1981; Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, 1995; Park & Judd, 1990; Park & Rothbart, 1982; Park, Ryan, & Judd, 1992).

The tendency to assign stereotype traits to members of out-groups is affected by several factors. As might be expected from a variety of theories, stereotype ratings of out-group members are facilitated when the in-group membership is made salient (Wilder & Shapiro, 1991). Stereotypic attributions are also affected by the range of out-groups considered. Generally most research supports a kind of contrast effect where stereotypes of a given out-group become more positive when other negative out-groups are considered. Diab (1963b) found that Arab students' stereotypes of certain groups (French, Negroes, and Chinese) became more positive when these groups were judged in the context of negative groups (Jews and Turks) rather than a fuller range of groups. Diab (1963a) showed that stereotypes of Americans were more positive when Russia was also rated than when not, and stereotypes of the French were more negative in the context of ratings of Algerians, a positive group for these subjects. Sometimes assimilation effects are found. In a more recent study, by Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, and Hayes (1992) Australian students had more positive stereotypes of Americans when also rating only English and Australians (positive groups) than when rating Americans in the context of English, Australians, Iraqis and the Soviet Union. After the Gulf War this effect was reversed with more positive ratings in the extended range condition.

**Attributions**: I have emphasized throughout this book that stereotypes are more than features attached to social categories. They also involve theories about this particular kind of glue. One kind of explanation is causal attribution. Do we attribute the behavior of those in the in-group and the out-group differently? Certainly there is abundant research supporting the proposition that attributions to self and others can be affected by wishes and desires, what is usually called egocentric or ego bias (Hewstone, 1989b). The most obvious predictions for group attributions enunciated by Pettigrew (1979) in what he called the "ultimate attribution error" are that negative behaviors by out-group members will more often be seen as dispositional compared to similar attributions for one's own groups. We are bad because of the situations, lack or other unstable and largely external factors, whereas those other people are bad because they are lazy, stupid, or just plain bad. Conversely, good behaviors should be attributed more often to external or unstable forces for out-groups then for in-groups. Pettigrew also suggested that such biases would be greater for prejudiced people, in situations where group memberships were salient, and where there was a history of inter-group conflict.
A review of attribution research by Hewstone (1990) concludes that there is a general tendency for attributions to vary more for failure than for success situations and that most studies find the predicted in-group bias for ability ratings (i.e., in-group failure seen as due less to lack of ability than out-group failure). However, predicted results are not as often found for attributions to effort, luck, and task difficulty (Hewstone, 1990) and are not always found for all groups.

In a representative study using racial groups, Jackson, Sullivan, and Hodge (1993) had white subjects rate black and white targets who were described as having strong or weak academic records. Behavior that was inconsistent with the stereotype (i.e., poor records for the white students and strong for the blacks) tended to be seen as due to external (luck, task difficulty) or unstable (effort) reasons especially for the black out-group. Note particularly that the successful black is seen as having about the same ability as the successful white but having tried harder and been more lucky. Conversely white students who do poorly don’t try hard enough, but blacks who have weak credentials lack ability. The success of the in-group is seen as due to high ability whereas the success of the black out-group is seen as due to both ability and effort. Table 6.1 has data for the various attributions. Such ingroup favoring evaluations can and do contribute to more general ingroup evaluative bias (Chatman & von Hippel, 2001).

Table 7.2: Attributions for Blacks and Whites with Strong and Weak Academic Credentials (from Jackson, et al., 1993, Table 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ability</th>
<th>Strong Credentials</th>
<th>Weak Credentials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outgroup - Non-</td>
<td>Ingroup -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stereotypic</td>
<td>Stereotypic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Credentials</td>
<td>Credentials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability</td>
<td>8.96</td>
<td>8.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effort</td>
<td>9.25</td>
<td>6.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luck</td>
<td>3.89</td>
<td>2.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task Factors</td>
<td>7.32</td>
<td>5.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note high numbers mean that the factor was more important whether high or low. So a high rating for ability can mean either that the person had high ability (when successful) or low ability when not.

There are other more subtle attributional effects. For example, people tend to describe the positive behaviors of in-group members and the negative behaviors of out-group members in more abstract way which implies that the behaviors are caused by more stable, internal dispositions (Maass, 1999). Also especially when threatened, people see the attitudes held by their group as being based more on rationality and less on emotion and external influence than the attitudes of out-groups (Kenworthy & Miller, 2001). Another subtle possibility is that we see members of in-groups as somehow more human than members of out-groups. Leyens, Rodriguez-Perez, Rodriguez-Torres, Gaunt, Paladino, Vaes, & Demoulin (2001) showed that secondary emotions (e.g., sorrow, contempt, conceit) which are found only in humans are attributed less to out-groups than in-groups. Primary emotions (e.g., fear, surprise) which

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8The careful reader will note that since this study did not use black subjects, we cannot disentangle ingroup-outgroup perception effects from possible real differences between groups.
are found among many animal species and are thereby less human are not differentially attributed to in-groups and out-groups. We will consider attributional processing in more detail in Chapter 14.

Other Cognitive Effects

**Complexity of Processing**: Several people have suggested that information about in-groups is processed in more complex ways (e.g., Schaller, 1992b) in part because we typically have more information about our own groups (Linville & Fischer, 1993). It is also likely that we store memory for in-groups more in terms of exemplars and out-groups more in terms of prototypes (Coats & Smith, 1999; Jackson, Lewandowski, Ingram, & Hodge, 1997). Other research (Rothman & Hardin, 1997) has suggested that affect cues are more important in judging out-groups, whereas more informational cues are used for in-groups. While not definitive, all these results point to our having a more cognitively differentiated view of in-groups which facilitates more complex processing.

**Prototype Judgments**: While most theories stress the evaluation of group members collectively, we sometimes judge groups on the basis of one or two salient exemplars whom we take to be prototypic. For well defined groups with highly salient exemplars (e.g., Michael Jordan for pro basketball players) the prototype may remain fairly constant, but SCT suggests that prototypes like group evaluations depend on context. In particular when differences between the in-group and out-group are salient, more extreme members of out-groups may be seen as relatively more representative of that group (Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, Turner, & Oonorato, 1995).

**Memory**: In the past three decades cognitive psychologists have focused on cognitive biases associated with memory, so we might expect to find differential memory for in-group and out-group behaviors (e.g., Kanungo & Das, 1960; Schaller, 1991). For example, Howard and Rothbart (1980) found that subjects were better able to recognize negative items for the out-group than for the in-group. Stereotype consistent behavior is recalled better for out-groups and stereotype inconsistent for in-groups (Koomen & Dijker, 1997). We are also especially prone to recall negative behaviors that have dispositional explanations and positive that are situationally caused for out-groups (Ybarra, Stephan, & Schaberg, 2000).

Memory for other category information about people may also be important. For example, I as a professor see a person I classify as a student. But I might also categorize that person in terms of major, year in college, post-graduate plans and so forth. Similarly I see another professor whom I might classify in terms of departmental affiliation, gender, or seniority. On the other hand, I might be tempted to classify both the student and the other professor as part of the general Rice community. Park and Rothbart (1982) argued, and found, that superordinate membership should be equally well recalled for both in-group and out-group members, so that having encountered many people I should remember which were part of the Rice community and which came from another university. On the other hand, subcategories for in-group members ought to be especially useful because we have a greater need to distinguish among the members of our own groups. So I should be more likely to remember the departmental affiliation of other faculty than the majors of students. In an extension Mackie and Worth (1989) have shown that this superior recall of subcategory information for the in-group is especially pronounced for comparatively rare sub-cATEGORIES on the assumption that such categories provide more information. In addition unlike Park and Rothbart, Mackie and Worth found some weak evidence supporting in-group biased recall -- in particular subjects were most likely to recall subcategory information for negative in-group members and to recall subcategory information best about positive out-group members.

**Perceptions of Values and Attitudes**: Generally it is easy for people to assume that members of salient out-groups do not share their basic attitudes and values, and as we will see in the next chapter that is a basic source of prejudice. In some cases that may well be true; we would certainly expect that pro-life and pro-choice adherents, for example, would in fact differ in many important ways as might Republicans and Democrats, atheists and conservative Christians. But we still have the right to ask whether these differences might not be exaggerated and in ways that support group conflict. A study by Dawes, Singer, and Lemons (1972) suggests that this might be the case. In this study members of various groups (e.g., hawks and doves on the Vietnam War) were asked to write attitude statements that they
thought represented the views of the other side. However, both groups wrote items that were, if fact, much more extreme than the real attitudes of the other side and ones that the other side could not endorse. Obviously political partisans over-estimate the extremity of the other side.

More recent research has also confirmed that people tend to see the attitudes of out-groups as more extreme than they are. This has been found for pro-choice and pro-life advocates as well as political conservatives and liberals (Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995). In one interesting study (Keltner & Robinson, 1997) English professors who were identified with either traditional, classic reading or those who wished to add more reading from minorities and women were asked to list books they thought the other group would pick for a freshman English course. The two groups agreed on half their choices, but both groups thought that the other group would pick more books representing their viewpoint than they did.

Aside from the support these kinds of results provide for the idea that people try to differentiate themselves from out-groups, they are important if for no other reason than the interpersonal mischief they cause. It is hard to remain reasonable in a debate when you think the other side has extreme views, and the possibility that each side thinks the other is defending a more extreme version than they do can lead to all manner of self-fulfilling prophecy effects not to mention misunderstandings.

**Homogeneity Effects**

Clearly we tend to stereotype members of out-groups more than members of in-groups, both in our assignment of traits and in more general attributions for behavior. However, there is a more subtle and potentially more important effect. We tend to see members of out-groups as more similar to one another than we do members of our own groups. My own group is variable, but members of your group act, think, and look alike. This perception is usually referred to as out-group homogeneity. As we shall see this has important implications for the ways we process information about people in out-groups.

**Facial Recognition**

Most of the research on out-group homogeneity has dealt with traits, but a body of research on facial recognition also bears witness to this idea. Almost a century ago Feingold (1914) argued that cross-race identification might be difficult because of lack of familiarity that people have with members of other races. People in other racial groups "all look alike."

**Basic Effects**

The empirical fact of cross-race deficits in memory was first shown in a study by Malpass and Kravitz (1969) for white subjects rating black subjects, but the general effect has since been confirmed for black subjects as well (e.g., Brigham & Barkowitz, 1978; Barkowitz & Brigham, 1982; Devine & Malpass, 1985; Teitelbaum & Geiselman, 1997). In general both white and black subjects have more trouble recognizing members of the other race (Bothell, Brigham, & Malpass, 1989) although the effect tends to be somewhat stronger for white subjects (Anthony, Copper, & Mullen, 1992; Cross, Cross, & Daly, 1971). The effects have also been demonstrated with other races and ethnic groups (Chance, Goldstein, & McBride, 1975; Platz & Hosch, 1988; Teitelbaum & Geismann, 1997).

**Explanations**

**Faces May Differ:** Unfortunately we do not know why this effect occurs. Brigham and Malpass (1985) suggested four possibilities. One obvious explanation is that facial features actually are more homogeneous for some groups than others. There is no evidence that black, Asian, and white faces are differentially homogeneous (Goldstein, 1979a; Goldstein & Chance, 1978). At the same time this explanation cannot be ruled out given that selection of white and black faces for this kind of research is far from random.

**Prejudice:** Another possibility is that the relative inability to discriminate faces from another racial group is related to prejudice. However, most studies (e.g., Brigham & Barkowitz, 1978; Platz & Hosch, 1988; Slone, Brigham, & Meissner, 2000) find that the effect is not related to traditional measures of racial prejudice. And even if it were, we would still be no closer to uncovering the mechanisms that underlie the effect.
**Contact and Familiarity**: The most obvious explanation is differential familiarity -- perhaps white people, for example, have more trouble recognizing individual blacks because they have not seen enough black faces to learn discriminable features whereas blacks are generally exposed to more white faces because there are more whites in the general population of Western countries. The data for this hypothesis are mixed with some studies finding small effects of familiarity (e.g., Brigham, Maass, Snyder, & Spaulding, 1982; Cross, Cross, & Daly, 1971; Slone, Brigham, & Meissner, 2000), but others finding no effect (e.g., Brigham & Barkowitz, 1978; Malpass & Kravitz, 1969; Ng & Lindsay, 1994).

On the assumption that contact may make a difference, we still need to know why. Anthony, et al. (1992) argue that the effect results from the different ways we cognize large and small groups. In particular smaller groups are more salient than larger groups, and consequently the smaller groups are processed in terms of prototype representations whereas the larger groups are processed in terms of exemplars. According to this model (Mullen, 1991), prototypic representations, in which one exemplar stand for the whole lead to perceptions of greater homogeneity than do exemplar representations. This model would predict that perceived homogeneity would be larger for the large group (whites) perceiving the smaller (blacks) which is not always true although generally effects are stronger for white subjects. Also as predicted when people process information effortfully, they will be inclined to use their favored representations even more (Anthony, et al., 1992).

**Processing Differences**: A fourth line of attack has been to look for various cognitive accounts -- perhaps we process facial information from different races differently. Obviously at some level this has to be true, but we have not yet been able to uncover the why's in this case. One might argue that people pay less attention to faces from other races, but differential attention does not seem to mediate the effect (Devine & Malpass, 1985). Zebrowitz, Montepare, and Lee (1993) have shown that samples of American whites, American blacks, and Koreans make similar trait attributions to faces of same and other races and use about the same cues in so doing. In fact intra-race agreement on facial features was quite high. This suggests that we are capable of attending to the features of faces from other races and in discriminating one person from another, although it does not mean that we always do. Feedback and visual training seems to reduce the effect (Malpass, Lavigne, & Weldon, 1973). Another possibility is especially for those with limited cross-race contact, the salience of skin color simply overwhelms other information. We know that blacks and whites find different aspects of faces salient (Ellis, Deregowski, & Shepherd, 1975). In one interesting study white subjects tended to use hair color, hair texture, and eye color in describing pictures, whereas black subjects used tone of skin color, eye size, eyebrows, and ears. It may well be (although not shown in this study) that the latter set of cues are better for discriminating black faces and the former for white.

**Practicalities**

It is tempting to assume that this phenomenon is fairly unimportant. Yet a bit of reflection suggests the opposite. At the theoretical level there are important unanswered questions about the cues we use for facial recognition work better for some types of faces than others and whether this translates into judgments about people. At a practical level, failures to recognize people of other races can be seen as interpersonal slights and can contribute to inter-racial mischief. Even more importantly, such effects are bound to be important in criminal trials where eyewitness identification is crucial, and when the eyewitness and perpetrator are of different races (Shapiro & Penrod 1985).

**Trait Homogeneity**

It is probable that the “they all look alike” phenomenon is limited to those groups for which group membership is largely based on physical appearance, although in fairness there have been no attempts to study whether people also think that doctors and lawyers for example have a homogeneous appearance (or at least have trouble discriminating them perceptually). However, traits and behaviors are not only at the heart of stereotypes but also are ascribed to all groups regardless of how they are constituted. Therefore, most of the research on out-group homogeneity has concentrated on perceived trait homogeneity although related work on memory confusions (see Chapter 3) and the group attribution error (Chapter 14) makes similar points.
Are Out-Groups Perceived to Be More Homogeneous?

Basic Effects: The majority of published studies report in-group vs. out-group effects such that people in other groups are perceived in more stereotypic and less individual terms than people in one's own group (Linville, Salovey, & Fischer, 1986; Messick & Mackie, 1989; Mullen & Hu, 1989; Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). We see people from other groups as more similar or homogeneous than we see people from other groups. This is not a static effect - as SCT and Brewer's (1991) Optimal Distinctiveness They make clear, perceptions of other groups depend in part on whether social or individual identities are more salient as well as the comparison groups. Thus out-group homogeneity is neither inevitable nor necessarily the most important form of homogeneity.

There are many demonstrations of out-group homogeneity. For example, Jones, Woods, and Quattrone (1980) asked members of student clubs to rate members of their own and of other clubs. The range of ascribed traits across members was greater for own than for other clubs. White subjects have more complex views about whites than about blacks (Linville & Jones, 1980), and both black and white adults, but not college students) see the other group as more homogeneous (Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, 1995). Similar effects have been found for age (Breweer & Lui, 1984; Linville, 1982; Linville, et al., 1989), nationalities (Linville, et al., 1989), and college majors (Park & Judd, 1990; Judd, Ryan, & Park, 1991). Results for gender are mixed with some studies (e.g., Park & Rothbart, 1982) finding the effects and others not (e.g., Linville, et al., 1989). Out-group homogeneity effects tend to be fairly weak when present and are not found for all groups, but there is no doubt that the effect is real (Mullen & Hu, 1989; Ostrom & Sedikides, 1993).

Symmetry: In addition to some ambiguity of results, there are other issues with the studies just cited in terms of their implications for stereotyping. Since in many studies people from a single group rated those from another, one cannot be certain how much of a role actual experience and real group differences may have had. For example, in one study young people were shown to have less differentiated views of older than of younger people (Linville, 1982). Although the hypothesis of less complex perceptions of out-groups is reasonable and probable, it is also possible that older people really are, in fact, less differentiated than younger people. If that were true, then everyone, young and old, would see the old as more homogeneous.

The obvious way around this problem is to have young and old people, men and women, etc. rate one another. We would then expect to find that old people rate young people as less diverse than young people rate themselves as well as the reverse. Several studies (Breweer, 2001; Judd, Ryan, & Park, 1991; Linville, et al., 1989; Park & Judd, 1990; Park & Rothbart, 1982) have shown that homogeneity effects are reasonably symmetrical such that members of Group A rate members of Group B as more homogeneous, while members of Group B rate the A's as more homogeneous.

Types of Variability: When you stop and think about it, there are likely to be several kinds of variability in our perceptions of groups. Quattrone (1986) has suggested three types. The first, is dimensional variability -- how much do we perceive people in a group to differ for a particular trait, attitude, or other characteristic? This is what most researchers in this area have had in mind when they considered variability.

Second, we might have group or general variability -- how much the group differs across a wide range of dimensions. Kashima and Kashima (1993) point out that this is a part of stereotypes in its own right. For example, most Americans probably believe that the Japanese people are quite homogenous as a group for most psychological features because their culture encourages uniformity.

Third, Quattrone points to what we might call taxonomic variability. This refers to how various attributes are related. Schneider and Blankmeyer (1983) showed that one effect of stereotypes is to make features allegedly possessed by that group seem more closely related. In a sense the stereotype acted to cement feature relationships. Linville, Fisher, and Yoon (1996) further showed that traits were more highly inter-correlated for out-groups but only when they were unfamiliar.

So, for example, politeness and intelligence might not be seen to be related for Americans (think of all the rude, arrogant, intelligent people you know), but might be seen to be highly positively related for Japanese. This has at least two important implications. Suppose you were trying to categorize people
as intelligent and polite. For an American sample, you might see these traits as totally unrelated such that there are polite-intelligent people, impolite-intelligent people, etc. However, in the extreme case if politeness and intelligence are highly related for a Japanese sample, there would be little point in having 4 separate groups since there would be few exemplars in the polite-stupid, and impolite-intelligent groupings. Thus, just considering these two traits, one would have two subgroups of Japanese and four for Americans. As we will see, the number of subgroups cognitively represented for groups turns out to be an important mediator of perceptions of homogeneity. A second and arguably more important implication is that, if we see a group as generally homogeneous, knowing one trait about a person from that group gives us license to infer others (See Chapter 5).

Measurement of Homogeneity: Most research has focused on dimensional variability, but before discussing the reasons for homogeneity effects in this area, we should discuss how we might measure group homogeneity. Several measures have been widely used, and some studies (e.g., Linville, et al., 1989) have found that in-group/out-group effects are found for some measures but others. Therefore we need to consider the various measures and which might be best.

Similarity Measures: One measure is simply a direct rating of similarity. Typically this question is asked in terms of how similar to one another the members of the group are seen to be (e.g., Kraus, Ryan, Judd, Hastie, & Park, 1993; Park & Rothbart, 1982). A related measure has been the percentage of people who would endorse a particular stereotypic trait, attitude, or behavior and, in some studies, the percentage of group members who would endorse counter-stereotypic characteristics (Quattrone & Jones, 1980; Park & Rothbart, 1982; Park & Hastie, 1987).

Variability: Others have used more complex tasks that seem to capture the essence of the homogeneity concept by more directly examining variability. Perhaps the most straightforward measure of variability is the range. Subjects are asked to indicate the points on a scale that include the highest and lowest member of the group (Brown & Wooton-Millward, 1993; Jones, Wood, & Quattrone, 1981; Simon & Brown, 1987).

Variability estimates can also be calculated from somewhat more sophisticated distribution tasks. Subjects can be asked to distribute percentages of people across the various scale points for some trait (Judd & Park, 1988; Linville, et al 1989; Park & Hastie, 1987). Or they can assign dots of different sizes to represent percentages of people in the group that fall at particular points along the dimension (Park & Judd, 1990). Imagine a subject rating groups on perceived intelligence. This subject might rate Groups A, B, and C as equally intelligent (say 5 on a 7-point scale), but assign the distributions given in Table 7.3. Common sense suggests that although the groups are perceived as being alike in some important respects (namely the mean rating), the perceivers still seems to have a more stereotyped view of group A than of B or C. She would be more confident that a person from A is really moderately intelligent than she would for a member of Group B or Group C.

Given the distributions given in the example, there are at least two statistics of interest. One would be the common standard deviation which is related to the mean deviations from the mean.9 Another measure suggested by Linville and her colleagues (1989) is usually called PDIST which measures the extent to which two randomly chosen group members will be seen as different on the judged attribute10. This measure, while similar to the standard deviation, differs in that PDIST is

\[ P_d = 1 - \sum p_i^2 \] where \( p \) is the proportion in each category i

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9 To be perfectly accurate the variance is directly proportional to the squared deviation of every score from every other score in a distribution, perhaps the most direct measure of intra-group similarity that one could imagine.

10 The exact formula is

\[ P_d = 1 - \sum p_i^2 \]
maximized when the distribution is flat (equal numbers of people placed in each category) where as the standard deviation is maximized with a bimodal distribution, with most scores being placed at the two end points of the distribution.

Table 7.3: Hypothetical Distributions for Ratings of Intelligence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Unintelligent</th>
<th>Intelligent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exceptionally</td>
<td>Highly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relationships of Measures: The obvious question is how these measures are related to one another. If they are all highly correlated, one might as well use the simpler measures that subjects understand well and are easy to administer. If, on the other hand, they do not correlate highly with one another, we must ask which measure seems to be best. A careful study of these questions by Park and Judd (1990) suggests that by and large the measures do not correlate so highly that they are interchangeable. In fact many of the correlations among these measures are remarkably low.

Which then is the best measure? Obviously that is a difficult question to answer in the absence of a clear criterion of "best", but one approach would be to examine which measure best yields the expected in-group out-group effect. By that criterion the standard deviation from the dot task, the percentage estimates of the number of people in the group that have the trait, and the rated range turn out to be the best measures. All measures showed differences in the predicted direction, but only these measures produced statistically significant differences between in-groups and out-groups.

In a latent variable analysis, two general factors were found. The first includes measures of dispersion and the second the extent to which people are seen as fitting the stereotype. The dispersion measures indicate how well members of the group cluster around the central tendency. The second factor is primarily defined by measures that show a difference between endorsement of stereotypic and counterstereotypic traits for a group. In other words, this measure reflects how many people in the group could be said to exemplify the stereotype.

Accuracy of Variability Judgments: Surely some groups really are more variable than others. For example, on a political liberal-conservative dimension, one might expect to find that a group of registered Democratic voters in Texas is probably more variable than a group of socialists along any number of political dimensions. Some religious groups seem to be less variable than others if for no other reason than the fact that some religions impose a strong set of doctrinal beliefs on their members.

Is there any evidence that people's judgments of variability track these differences? Several studies show that such judgments are sensitive to real differences in group variability (Judd, Ryan, & Park, 1991; Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983; Nisbett & Kunda, 1985; Park & Hastie, 1987). That is not to say that people are enormously accurate at this sort of task. Judd, Ryan, & Park (1991) have found that subjects typically overestimate the perceived standard deviation of group distributions (heterogeneity), but as one might expect more for in-groups than for out-groups. For range measures of variability subjects typically underestimate variability, but more for the out-group than for the in-group. Subjects also tend to be more accurate in judging dispersions for in-groups than for out-groups,
particularly when using measures of the groups stereotypicality. This latter result suggests that familiarity may play a role in accuracy, assuming that in-groups are more familiar.

**Theories**

Several theories have been postulated to account for outgroup homogeneity effects. Some of these are heavily cognitive whereas others suggest various motives may come into play. Even within the cognitive models, however, there are major differences in how such effects are produced.

**Motivational Explanations:** There are also likely to be motivational reasons for these effects, and some theories make more of these motivational underpinnings than others. For example, when outgroups are relatively unfamiliar it may be more important to emphasize similarities of group members because this is functional for relatively unknown stimuli which can be quite dangerous (Campbell, 1956). Also, our own sense of individuality may be enhanced by seeing others as more homogeneous. When there is conflict between groups, out-group homogeneity may help to reduce anxiety because of greater assumed predictability of the out-group when it is homogeneous. It is also probably easier to commit aggressive acts against out-group members when they are deindividuated and dehumanized.

In that regard we should stress the strong possibility that in everyday life in-group and out-group homogeneity effects are multiply determined. It is quite possible that a cognitive bias to see out-group people as particularly homogeneous may become a part of cultural lore and reinforced by societal processes. And in situations where there is conflict between groups, pre-existing cognitive effects may be exaggerated by various needs to see the out-group as bad and hostile. Thus as we explore the various explanations, we should keep in mind that at our present level of knowledge there is little to be gained in assuming that some models are right at the expense that others may be wrong.

**Exemplar Models:** Linville and her colleagues (Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989) have proposed an exemplar model, which like other such models (see Chapter 3), requires that information be stored in terms of exemplars encountered. As we meet people, we remember things about them and store this information along with information about their group memberships. We may also store only attribute information, remembering that we met an unpleasant person without necessarily storing additional information about that person.

Unlike earlier exemplar models, Linville’s does allow information to be stored at a more abstract level. So, for example, if I have previously made a judgment about the typical Rice student, I might have stored that judgment in memory. The next time I have to make such a judgment I might reuse that summary judgment information as an exemplar, or I might bring forth additional individual exemplars to use. However, these abstract judgment exemplars have no special priority over more concrete instances and just serve as another kind of exemplar or instance. In a similar fashion I may use an exemplar second-hand account that is not based on first-hand experience (Linville & Fischer, 1993).

**Implications:** There are two major implications of this perspective. The first is that all stereotype judgments are based on memories for behaviors and are not formed during the perception process. When I have to make a judgment about how lazy a group of people is, I bring forth exemplars (whether individual, previous judgment, or second-hand) and calculate the judgment on the spot. The same is true for variability judgments. I retrieve several exemplars and try to estimate how variable they seem.

Second, Linville and her colleagues argue that exemplar representation in memory creates the out-group homogeneity effect because of differential familiarity. As one meets more and more exemplars from a given group not only the number but the variability of exemplars increases. There are statistical reasons for why large samples generally produce somewhat higher variability (see Linville & Fischer, 1993), but beyond that it must be said that this assumption is only that. More recently, Linville and Fischer (1993) have argued that our representations of unfamiliar out-groups may contain more second-hand representations. Since these exemplars could be expected to lie closer to the average for the group, they will reduce the perceived variability of out-groups if retrieved and used to generate variability judgments.

**Empirical Support:** Linville and her colleagues have done computer simulations which support the notion that exposure to more exemplars does lead to judgments of greater heterogeneity. In addition
greater familiarity with groups does lead to greater perceived heterogeneity (Islam & Hewstone, 1993b; Linville & Fischer, 1993). For example, Linville, Fischer, & Salovey (1989) found that as students in an introductory psychology class got to know each other better over the course of a semester, perceptions of heterogeneity increased. Also Linville & Fischer (1993) have pointed out that out-group homogeneity effects do tend to be smaller for gender groups that for other groups based on age or race; men and women tend to know more about each other than most other groups such as age-based or occupation-based groups.

However, ratings of familiarity of groups do not seem to mediate out-group homogeneity (Park, et al., 1992). In addition, several studies have found out-group homogeneity effects, at least under some circumstances, with minimal groups (Judd & Park, 1988; Mackie, Sherman, & Worth, 1993). In minimal groups subjects would not have time to discover any real information about differential homogeneity even if it existed. Also out-group homogeneity effects have been found for well-acquainted groups where differential knowledge is also minimized (Bolody & Kashy, 1999; Park & Rothbart, 1982). However, the thrust of this research would tend to suggest that differential familiarity is not a necessary condition for relative out-group homogeneity although it may contribute to it.

We must also be aware that while on average knowing more about a group may increase perceived variability, in individual cases we may gain information that either increases or decreases variability. Linville and her colleagues reasonably assume that generally groups are equally homogeneous and that our learning of information about groups is relatively unbiased. But in everyday life, one might find out more information about the similarity of in-groups and differences among out-groups, and in such cases one might expect familiarity to lead to greater homogeneity for some groups (Kashima & Kashima, 1993). That is not to say that in real-life and in extreme cases, differential familiarity about in-groups and out-groups is never important in the ways Linville suggests, but only that it cannot be a full cause of the differential homogeneity.

**Differential Processing**: Tom Ostrom and his colleagues (Ostrom, Carpenter, Sedikides, & Li, 1993; Carpenter, 1993) have argued that at least part of the in-group homogeneity effect arises from the way information is encoded and stored. When we initially form categories, we focus on how prospective exemplars are alike. If you wanted to know what a xert was, it would make perfect sense to think about all the ways prospective xerts fit the category and by implication are like other xerts. Even after you gain more information about these categories, you may continue to emphasize the ways exemplars are similar. For categories to which we belong, however, there is often little reason to emphasize such similarities. For one thing we are often aware of the fact that we are different from other people in our group, and sometimes we are motivated to differentiate ourselves from others in our groups, often in terms of sub-types (Brewer, 1993).

This leads Ostrom to propose that information about out-group members may be categorized in terms of attributes (i.e., in terms of dimensions of similarity) and in-group people in terms of person. Ostrom, et al., (1993) show that when information is presented about various people having various features, memory for out-group information is clustered according to attribute whereas in-group information tends to be clustered according to person. Thus, this model suggests that out-group homogeneity is mediated, in part, by the possibility that we tend to think of out-group people as exemplifying certain traits or attributes which tend to emphasize the ways in which they are alike.

**On-Line Abstraction**: Park and Judd and their colleagues (Judd & Park, 1988; Park & Judd, 1990; Park et al., 1991; Kraus, Ryan, Judd, Hastie, & Park, 1993) argue that abstractions are formed on-line during processing of new information. The Park-Judd model also allows for storing individual exemplars in addition to an abstract running summary of group characteristics.

Hastie and Park (1986) argued that some judgments are formed continuously on-line as we encounter new-information. One paradigm case might be the interviewer who is judging job suitability. As she sees each new bit of behavior from a particular candidate, she may adjust her assessment periodically. Thus at any point in the interview process we should expect that she has a well-formed, if still provisional, judgment about whether this person is suitable for the job. One important feature of these on-line judgments is that they are not based on memory for any particular bit of behavior. Our
interviewer may have noticed the slightly arrogant way the job candidate answered her first question, and that behavior contributed to her early judgment about whether this young man can do the job she wants. However, two days later when she actually makes her final judgment she will have a summary assessment which is based in part on this bit of arrogant behavior, but now not be able to recall the behavior.

Table 7.3 gives a hypothetical example in which we have assumed primacy effects where earlier behaviors are weighted more than later behaviors. Note that in this hypothetical example even though the interviewer sees equally numbers and degrees of positive and negative information, the final evaluation is slightly negative. This results in part from the extreme importance of the first piece of information (in this case negative). Note further that even if the interviewer could not recall the arrogant behavior, it still has contributed to her final evaluation. Therefore when judgments are formed on-line, there is typically little relationships between the actual judgment and what is recalled about the object of the judgment. We probably typically make judgments about likability on-line, for example.

Table 7.3: Hypothetical On-Line Impression of Interviewer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Behavior</th>
<th>Evaluation of Behavior</th>
<th>Weight of Behavior</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrogant</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smart</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humorous</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vulgar</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smart</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eager</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imprecise</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dishonest</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confident</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prejudiced</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: I have assumed that each new piece of information is weighted less than the previous one. The impression after each piece of behavior is the average of the previous impression (weighted 1.0) and the weighted evaluation of the new piece of behavioral information.

Memory-based judgments, on the other hand, are not based on a continuous up-dating, but on our memories for behaviors, and these memories may, of course, be biased in any number of ways. The interviewer for the example in Table 7.3 might only remember that the interviewee was smart and confident and therefore be surprised herself that her negative evaluation doesn’t seem to fit the behaviors she remembers. Such memory-based judgments are quite common. If I am asked to judge how political liberal a group of student is, I may find that I had never really thought about this before. Hence I now have to rely on my memories for what these students have done and said, and make the judgment accordingly. In this case I may give special weight to the last several students I encountered who happened to be particularly liberal.

While we clearly do process information about others on-line at least some of the time, there are data suggesting that judgments of variability are formed from memory representation and not on-line. Mackie, Sherman, and Worth (1993) have shown that judgments of variability show relatively long latencies. Theoretically, if judgments are formed on-line, they should be relatively available and easy to get at when one has to produce a judgment. On the other hand, if they must be constructed on the spot, so to speak, it might take subjects a relatively long time to retrieve the relevant information and to
calculate a variability judgment. In the research of Mackie, et al (1993), judgments of group variability took a fairly long time (about as long as it did to make judgments about other traits not directly presented, almost certainly memory-based judgments) and longer than judgments about likeability, judgments that are known to be formed on-line (Hastie & Park, 1986).

According to this model there are several reasons why out-group homogeneity effects occur. The first is that we are more likely to store exemplars as well as abstract information about the in-group. Thus when asked to make a judgment about my own group, I will draw on the abstract variability store but may also check that against individual exemplars which will surely vary to some extent from the group mean.

I may also have a richly developed sense of various types of in-group members, and thinking about these would probably emphasize differences among in-group members. Park, Ryan, & Judd (1992) expanded a suggestion by Park & Rothbart (1982) that in-groups may be more likely to be differentiated into sub-groups of various kinds. After all, if you are a member of a particular group, it may not always be helpful simply to know that a person is a member of your group. For a Baptist saying that another person is a Baptist may not tell her much about religious views, and she may want to further code this person in terms of which church she attends or where she falls on a dimension of fundamentalism. By contrast, knowing that someone is a Lutheran may be all the information she needs about that person.

Park, Ryan, & Judd (1992) had business and engineering students rate one another. They did show that each group mentioned more sub-groups with more distinguishing attributes for the in-group than for the out-group. More importantly, the tendency to sub-type in-groups more seemed to be an important mediator of the relative out-group homogeneity. When this tendency was statistically controlled, the out-group homogeneity effect was eliminated. In another experiment subjects were encouraged to think about people in terms of their sub-types, and this produced judgments of greater variability compared to subjects who did not actively sub-type. Thus, it may well be that one reason we perceive more variability among in-groups is because we can more readily think of them in terms of various sub-groups that differ from the generalized stereotype.

However, when you make judgments about an out-group, you will be inclined to use only the abstract information, rather than exemplars and sub-types. Thus according to this model the stored information about in-groups and out-groups may be equal in variability but at time of judgment additional information will affect the in-group variability judgments. Estimates of group variability do not seem to be strongly mediated by what people can remember about group members (Park & Hastie, 1987; Judd & Park, 1988). This suggests that variability judgments are calculated on-line rather than from memory representations. Also in studies where subjects are asked to talk aloud as they make these various judgments (e.g., Park & Judd, 1990), subjects tend to think about exemplars and sub-groups more for in-groups than for out-groups.

**Frequency-Distribution Model:** Kraus, Ryan, Judd, Hastie, & Park (1993) have recently modified their previous abstraction model by suggesting that subjects may generate frequency distributions on-line. That is, instead of constantly updating an abstract variability estimate, people place new exemplars they encounter on a scale. So as I meet a new person I may code her as moderately conservative, very kind, and moderately unattractive. I might then keep a tally of how many people I have met are highly conservative, moderately conservative, and the like. Thus for any given dimension, say political position, I can generate estimates of variability by recalling my latest frequency estimates because I have stored approximate information about how many people are very conservative, slightly conservative, etc.

However, these frequency dimensions can differ in terms of the number of scale points they represent. When I think about Arab attitudes toward Israelis, I may be able to code these merely as pro-Israel versus anti-Israel (thus having only a 2-point scale). On the other hand, when I think about American’s attitudes toward Israel I may divide people into four, five or even more categories. When I try to estimate the variability of Middle Easterners, I will probably see the variability as relatively low since I have divided the scale into only two positions. However, I seem to recognize more degrees of difference for Americans, and hence might be inclined to see more variability for this sample. Kraus, et
al., argue that we generally use finer divisions for in-group members in part because we know more about them. This would then tend to produce the out-group homogeneity effect.

There is some support for this model. Kraus, et al. (1993) had subjects think aloud as they processed information about people who varied in some characteristic. When the information was numerical (SAT scores) subjects clearly did keep running tallies of how many people fell into various parts of the total dimension. Another experiment showed that for non-skewed distributions when subjects used few rather than many discriminations along a dimension, their estimates of group variability were reduced.

**Self-Categorization Theory:** Social Identity Theory clearly makes a clear prediction that the mere act of categorization will lead to perceptions of intra-group homogeneity (a prediction not strongly confirmed – see Chapter 3) but does not predict the general finding of differential homogeneity for in-groups and out-groups. However, both SIT and Self Categorization Theory, a close relative of Social Identity Theory, emphasize that many factors affect perceptions of group homogeneity and that ingroup or out-group status is generally not the most important.

**Ingroup–Outgroup Differences:** Nonetheless, Social Categorization Theory points to a number of factors that may lead to differential perceptions of ingroup and outgroup homogeneity (Voci, 2000). This theory emphasizes the proposition that sometimes one's identity is well grounded in group belongingness while at other times personal identity is more important than one's social identity leading to differentiation between one's self and one's groups. Indeed we may seek an optimal level of differentiation. When we feel we are too submerged in our groups, we seek to show how we are different than others, but when we are feeling too different we may emphasize ways in which we are like others (Brewer, 1993). People who see themselves as different from their groups are more likely to see those groups as diverse than are subjects who see themselves as similar to the group. Thus, when social identity is salient, the in-group should actually be seen as especially homogeneous although perceptions of the out-group should be unaffected (Brewer, 1993). However, when personal or individual identity is emphasized the in-group should be seen as heterogeneous as one emphasizes differences between one's self and relevant in-group members. Indeed thinking about one's self does affect perceptions of the in-group more than of the out-group (Park & Judd, 1990).

How does this explain the ingroup-outgroup effect? The basic argument is that judgments of the two groups are made in different contexts. When asked to think about my ingroup my personal identity is likely to be important and hence in-group homogeneity diminished. On the other hand, when judging the outgroup the relevant context is the ingroup and out-group homogeneity is enhanced (Haslam, Oakes, Turner, & McGarty, 1995).

**Other Factors Affecting Perceptions of Homogeneity:** Self-Identity Theory and especially Self-Categorization Theory both emphasize that various factors affect our motivations to see in-groups and out-groups differently. For example as one's groups are under attack or threat, social identity is likely to be more important than personal identity and one will feel the need to see the group as maintaining a common front, promoting perceived ingroup homogeneity. My sense is that most of the time most Americans would regard Americans as a diverse group. However, at times of war Americans or threat (say after 9-11) they probably emphasize their common features. Groups that are in a numerical minority should feel more threatened and at least to take their group identifications more seriously. When a group is in a numerical minority, there is stronger in-group identification (Simon & Brown, 1987), and in-group homogeneity is known to be correlated with such greater group identification (Simon, Kulla, & Zobel, 1995; Simon & Pettigrew, 1990). Simon and Brown (1987) have also shown that numerical minorities tend to assume more homogeneity for in-groups than for out-groups with the reverse being true for numerical majorities. After a review of several studies in this area Mullen & Hu (1989) have concluded that relative size of the in-group is negatively correlated with perceived in-group homogeneity.

The effects of status on perceptions of group homogeneity are likely to be complex. One argument is that members of high status groups are likely to perceive low status groups as especially homogeneous (Lorenzi-Ciolkli, 1998). There may be many reasons for that including the possibility that such perceptions especially for negative traits help to maintain the higher status group's power and sense
of superiority without the strain of having to think about individual differences. On the other hand, members of low status groups may perceive themselves as especially heterogeneous especially when the basis of status or comparison reflects negatively on them (Doosje, Spears, Ellemers, & Koomen, 1999). In part this results from the tendency of groups to see themselves as heterogeneous, but for negative features, this perception also promotes a sense that “we’re not all bad.”

Additional evidence in support of this kind of model comes from studies in which salience of ingroup is correlated with relative in-group homogeneity. For example, perceptions of in-group homogeneity are also pronounced when judgments are made in the presence of the out-group (Wilder, 1984a). Finally, this model would suggest that in-groups would be seen as more homogeneous on characteristics central to the group than on those more peripheral, a prediction that has been confirmed by Brown and Wooton-Millward (1993), Kelly (1988), Wilder (1984a), and more weakly by Simon and Brown (1987). We would, after all, expect that religious groups as one example might see themselves as more homogeneous on doctrinal matters than on less relevant matters such as what kinds of cars are best.

To summarize, then, SIT and SCT both emphasize that judgments of group features as well as homogeneity are not static, chiseled in stone judgments. They depend on the context of judgment, what types of identity are salient, and desires to make the best case for one’s positive qualities as possible. While outgroups may sometimes, even often, be seen to be more homogeneous than ingroups this is far from inevitable and not necessarily the most important factor in perceived homogeneity.

**Implications of Group Variability**

**Induction:** The work here described would seem to fit one common observation that me and mine are more variable than you and yours. That is interesting and perhaps important for any number of reasons, but does this have any larger implications for the study of stereotyping? In Chapter 3 I suggested that groups we perceive to be homogeneous provide for inductive potential. If you assume that members of a group (or any category) are pretty much alike, then you should be willing to infer group properties from the behavior or a very few individuals.

Several studies have confirmed that we are more likely to infer information about other group members from out-groups in part because they are seen as more homogeneous than in-groups. For example in a study by Quattrone and Jones (1980) students from two rival universities observed a person from either their college or the other performing three behaviors that varied in terms of stereotypicality. Weakly stereotypic behaviors affected judgments about the group as a whole and more so for out-group than for in-groups. However, this result was not strong for stereotypic behaviors; as one might expect a single behavior by a single person is not likely to affect judgments about a group when one already has a strong sense (stereotype) of what the group is like. Additional research by Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda (1983) has also shown that people are more willing to make judgments about an-out-group than an in-group based on a single behavior.

**Evaluations:** Although it now widely agreed that even arbitrary groupings can easily lead to an in-group preference and rejection of out-groups, Linville and her colleagues have argued that the greater perceived differentiation of in-groups also plays a role in evaluation. She argues that more complex beliefs about groups (or individuals for that matter) likely result in moderate evaluations. In the extreme case if one knows only that people from a group vary on ambition and intelligence, one can see them as being positive on both traits, on neither, or on only one, giving us three degrees of positiveness. On the other hand, if one knew that people from the group vary also along dimensions of kindness, happiness, and politeness, there are five traits and any individual can have from 5 to 0 positive traits, providing for more degrees of positiveness.

In a study by Linville & Jones (1980) white subjects were shown to have less complex views of whites than blacks; for example, there were higher correlations among ratings of the blacks than of whites. Subsequently the subjects were asked to rate black and white candidates for law school. When the applicant’s materials were quite good, the black applicant was rated higher; but the black applicant was also rated lower than the white when credentials were relatively poor. However, Hass, Katz, Rizzo, Bailey, and Eisenstadt (1991) found no relationships between evaluation extremity and complexity.
In a subsequent set of studies Linville (1982) was able to tie down these effects more closely. She showed that college students had less complex views of old people than young people, and that there was a high correlation between these measures of complexity and evaluative extremity for the older stimulus persons. Finally, she manipulated the complexity of thought about several cookies, and found that those who were induced to have more complex thoughts were less extreme in their ratings of the cookies.

These studies then taken collectively suggest that we are more likely to infer from the individual to the group and the group to the individual for out-groups. Also we tend to evaluate out-group members in less complex ways, and this often leads to more extreme evaluations.